The set of additive cost sharing methods when individual demands are integer and cost shares are non negative, is characterized by its extreme points and by a network flow representation. The extreme methods allocate costs incrementally along a chain of demand vectors independent of the cost function. The result generalizes Wang's characterization in that we do not assume the Dummy axiom.
Cost sharing with discrete demands
We consider the familiar model where each one of a finite set of agents N demands a certain quantity x i of an idiosyncratic commodity i, i ∈ N . The demand profile x = (x i ) i∈N generates joint costs C(x). A cost sharing method divides C(x) among N , based on x and the entire cost function C.
The axiomatic treatment of this problem has a long history in cooperative game theory and a variety of applications. A survey treatment with extensive references is Moulin [2002] .
We examine the discrete version of this model where for all i, x i is an integer: each commodity comes in indivisible units. The discrete model, a recent addition to the literature (Moulin [1995] , de Nouweland et al. [1995] , Sprumont [2000] ), is topologically simpler than its more familiar continuous counterpart where x i is a non-negative real number. It also contains the classic cooperative game model as the special case where x i can only be zero or one.
The property that cost shares depend additively upon the cost function C is the key to most of the axiomatic results to date, beginning with Shapley's seminal paper (Shapley [1953] ). Here we characterize the extreme points of the set of additive cost sharing methods. Our result generalizes a similar characterization for the set of additive methods meeting the Dummy axiom due to Wang [1999] .
The Dummy property is the central equity postulate of Shapley's theory. It conveys the familiar idea of no cross-subsidization: individual agents should not pay for costs for which they are not responsible. An alternative principle is that equal demands should be charged equally, irrespective of asymmetries of the cost function. The two principles are not compatible, and both are commonly used: e.g., rural and urban mail are charged identically, despite the difference in their respective costs; on the other hand, international mail costs more than domestic mail. See Moulin and Sprumont [2002] for an extensive discussion of these two alternative principles in the context of additive cost sharing methods. Our theorem is the basis for a more general theory of additive cost sharing, one where the Dummy axiom is not automatically satisfied.
A corollary of our results is a variant of Wang's theorem, where the Dummy axiom is replaced by the apparently weaker property that we call Non-Dummy: if all agents but one are dummies, the non-dummy agent bears all the costs. We show that Dummy and Non-Dummy are equivalent for additive cost sharing methods.
The model and main result
We fix the finite set N of agents. A demand profile x is an element of N N , where N = {0, 1, ...}. The demand profile e i is the i-th coordinate vector. A cost function C maps N N into R N + , is non-decreasing and C(0) = 0. We write C for the set of such functions.
A cost sharing problem is a pair (
it picks a solution for every cost-sharing problem. The following property of c. s. methods is the subject of this paper:
We denote by Φ the set of additive cost sharing methods.
For any c. s. method ϕ and demand profile x, we write ϕ(x) for the restriction of ϕ to the problems (x, C): thus ϕ(x) maps C into R 
as follows:
These cost shares are non-negative because C is nondecreasing, and sum to C(x). Additivity is clear. Thus ϕ γ (x) is an element of Φ(x). The reader can easily verify that the mapping γ → ϕ γ (x) is one-to-one: two distinct labeled x-chains yield different cost sharing methods (recall that two consecutive labels are different). The number ρ(x) of labeled x-chains is large; one checks easily The theorem is a consequence of a network flow representation of additive cost sharing methods. We use the following notations:
where i ∈ P (z) we insert a directed edge from z to z + e i of unlimited capacity. Let G x denote this network. Let f (z, z + e i ) be the flow through the directed edge (z, z + e i ). A flow of a single unit from 0 to x in this network is any solution to the following system:
It is well known that the extreme points of this polyhedron will be the incidence vectors of paths from 0 to x.
Given a feasible unit flow, we can share it amongst the agents by specifying how much of the flow through each edge is allocated to each agent. To each directed edge (z, z + e i ), we associate a vector s(z, z + e i ) ∈ ∆(1). The r th component of s(z, z + e i ) is the fraction of the flow through (z, z + e i ) assigned to agent r.
Theorem 2 Flow representation
Given a unit flow f to x and a collection s(z, z 
is precisely the method represented by (s , f ). Thus Theorem 2 implies that any ϕ(x) ∈ Φ(x) is a convex combination of methods ϕ γ (x). The other statement of Theorem 1 is that each method ϕ γ (x) is an extreme point of Φ(x). It is proven in subsection 4.2.
Application: Dummy and Non-Dummy
Dividing costs in fixed proportions, irrespective of demands and cost asymmetries, is a simple method in Φ : ϕ(x, C) = C(x) · δ, where δ is independent of x and C. More responsive to the size of individual demands, the familiar proportional method, ϕ(x, C) =
C(x)
xi · x, also in Φ, is equally oblivious to cost asymmetries. The Dummy axiom eliminates the two methods above.
Dummy:
If serving agent i's demand is free, Dummy says that i should pay nothing. The next axiom is a weaker requirement: if all but one agent is "free," the remaining agent pays the bill.
Non-Dummy:
We prove that under Additivity, the properties Dummy and Non-Dummy are equivalent. 
Now fix C ∈ C for which a certain agent i is a dummy. In the sum defining ϕ γ i (x)(C), all terms where i k = i are zero; and when i k = i, the difference
is zero as well. Thus ϕ γ (x) satisfies Dummy. The x-methods ϕ γ (x) just described are called path generated x-methods in Wang [1999] . Indeed the labeled chain γ is described by an increasing path from 0 to x in which each increment raises exactly one coordinate; the corresponding cost increment is charged to this very agent.
Corollary 3 Role of Dummy and Non-Dummy
Given a method ϕ(x) in Φ(x), the three following properties are equivalent:
is a convex combination of path generated methods.
Wang [1999] proves the equivalence of i) and iii). It is easy to check that under the assumptions of Corollary 3, the flow representation in Theorem 2 is unique.
The special case where x i = 1 for all i is the classic cooperative game model. Corollary 3 implies a simple characterization of the random order values (Weber [1988] ). In the class of monotonic games, they are the only values meeting Additivity, Non-Dummy, and non-negative shares.
Proofs

Notations and preliminary results
We fix x throughout, and write an element of Φ(x) simply as ϕ. The first observation is that ϕ(C) only depends upon the restriction of C to [0, x] . For any two
. This property is called Independence of Irrelevant Costs and is proved in Lemma 1 of Moulin [1995] , to which we refer the reader for a proof.
Denote by C(x) the subset of R Additivity implies that ϕ is modular on D :
A modular function on a finite lattice takes the following form:
. Therefore the mapping z → λ(z) is a solution of the following linear system:
Conversely, to each mapping λ ∈ (R N ) ]0,x] satisfying the system (1), we associate a unique ϕ ∈ Φ(x) as follows. Each cost function C ∈ C(x) has a unique decomposition
(To prove this claim, notice that the range of C must be 0,
It is left to the reader to check that the mappings ϕ −→ λ and λ −→ ϕ just constructed, form a linear isomorphism of Φ(x) into the subset Λ of (R N ) ]0,x] defined by (1).
Extremality of ϕ γ in Φ(x).
This follows at once from two observations. For all D, ϕ γ (D) is a coordinate vector, namely an extreme point of ∆(1), whereas ϕ(D) ∈ ∆(1) for all D and all ϕ ∈ Φ(x). Moreover by Step 1, two elements of Φ(x) that coincide on D must be equal.
Proof of Theorem 3.
The first statement is clear: for any (s, f ) the formula in the theorem defines a method in Φ(x). Conversely, we pick ϕ in Φ(x) and derive a flow representation of the corresponding λ ∈ Λ.
Step 1
We show first that there exist non-negative vectors µ, one for each directed edge of G x such that
µ(x − e r , x).
Restating this componentwise for any i ∈ N :
and
where λ i and µ i denotes the i th component of λ and µ respectively. For i fixed, we define a network flow problem on G x by the system (2), (3) and (4) as follows:
Note that we have introduced a free variable λ i (0) which we will set equal to This is the desired equality for D ∈ D. The case of an arbitrary C ∈ C follows by additivity of ϕ.
